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UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Pierce v. Underwood,
___U.S._ 88 D.A.R. 8240,
No. 86-1512 (June 27, 1988).

Availability of Attorneys' Fees
Multipliers Severely Limited
Under Equal Access to Justice Act
The Supreme Court reversed a trial
court decision awarding fees in excess of
the statutory $75 per hour cap, holding
that only very limited "special factors"
will justify an award in excess of the
cap.
The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development was sued in several courts for
refusing to implement an operating
subsidy program. Following several
losses, a new Secretary settled remaining lawsuits, including the instant case.
Plaintiff moved for an award of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA), which mandates
the shifting of fees to the United States
"unless the court finds that the position
of the United States was substantially
justified." 28 U.S.C. section 2412(d)
(1)(A). Fee awards are limited to $75
per hour, "unless the court determines
that an increase in the cost of living or
a special factor, such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the
proceedings involved, justifies a higher
fee." 28 U.S.C. section 2412(d)(2).
The trial court determined that the
defendant's position was not substantially justified, and awarded fees to
plaintiff's counsel, the Western Center
on Law and Poverty, in the amount of
$1,129,450. This figure was based on
3,304 hours expended, with hourly rates
ranging from $80 to $120 per hour from
1976 through 1982, and then used a
multiplier of 3.5. Both the higher hourly
rates and the multiplier were based on
the court's finding that special factors
existed. Specifically, the trial court
relied upon the standard factors used to
adjust multipliers in attorneys' fees
awards (see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20
Cal. 3d 25, 49 (1977)), including both
the statutory example, and "the novelty
and difficulty of the issues,.. .the undesirability of the case,.. .the work and ability
of counsel, ... the results obtained,...[and]
customary fees and awards in other
cases." The Ninth Circuit upheld the
hourly rates based on the special factors, but rejected the use of the multiplier, reducing the award to $322,700.

The Supreme Court, per Justice
Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens and a concurrence on this issue by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun), upheld the
basis for an award, holding that the trial
court's decision to award a fee is reviewed using the abuse of discretion
standard, and should not be reviewed de
novo. On the amount, however, the
Supreme Court struck down each of the
factors used by the trial court to raise
the rates above $75 per hour. The Court
held that Congress had determined that
$75 per hour is reasonable regardless of
the true market rates, and only where
there is a highly specialized bar (such as
patent attorneys) could a special factor
justify a higher rate. The other factors,
although used in civil rights fee awards
under 42 U.S.C. section 1988, do not
apply under the EAJA.
Felder v. Casey,
-_U.S.-,
88 D.A.R. 8029,
No. 87-526 (June 22, 1988).
PlaintiffNeed Not Comply With
State Notice of Claims Statute
Priorto Filing Federal Civil
Rights Suit In State Court
The Supreme Court recently held
that a plaintiffs failure to comply with a
state claims statute does not bar the
filing of a civil rights lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 in state court.
The plaintiff sued the City of Milwaukee and several of its police officers
for injuries stemming from a disorderly
conduct arrest, alleging the events were
racially motivated. Plaintiff filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in state
court. Defendants moved to dismiss on
grounds that plaintiff failed to comply
with Wisconsin's notice of claims statute,
which requires that prior to the filing of
any suit against the state or a local
entity, a claim must be filed within 120
days of the events giving rise to the
claims. The trial court and intermediate
appellate court dismissed the state
claims, but refused to dismiss the federal claims. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed and dismissed the federal claim as well, reasoning that
although the federal government could
create causes of action cognizable in the
state courts, the states retain the power
to establish their own jurisdictional and
procedural rules.
The United States Supreme Court
(per Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun,
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Marshall, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy), held that the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution preempts any
procedural requirements on section
1983 actions that would tend to produce
a different outcome in state rather than
federal courts. Such a difference would
interfere with section 1983's remedial
purposes. Moreover, the statutory
scheme to permit redress of constitutional deprivations by state and local
officials does not permit a state-created
prerequisite of submission of the matter
to state officials before vindicating the
right. The primary purpose of claims
statutes is to limit governmental liability.
Although the claims statutes are part of
a legislative scheme to open up liability
by abrogating sovereign immunity, liability here is created not by the state but by
the federal government. The states may
not limit their exposure to liability created by the federal government.
Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Committee,
No. 87-1269.
Court to Decide Validity of
California Law ProhibitingParty
Endorsements in Primaries
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted
jurisdiction in an appeal from a Ninth
Circuit decision striking down California Election Code provisions which ban
party endorsements of candidates in primaries, and which regulate party memberships and internal operations. See Eu
v. San Francisco County Democratic
Central Committee, 826 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1987). At this writing, no date has
been set for argument.
NINTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
Gomez v. City of Watsonville,
.. F.2d____, 88 D.A.R. 9786,
No. 87-1751 (July 27, 1988).
At Large Elections Violate Voting
Rights Act of 1965
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that atlarge municipal elections diminish
Hispanic participation and power, thereby violating Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. section
1973.
The City of Watsonville, like 432 of
450 California cites, uses at-large districts for its city council and mayoral
elections. Watsonville switched from
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ward to at-large elections in 1950, when
Hispanics reached 10% of its population.
Currently, the city is 49% Hispanic overall, although the eligible voting percentage is somewhat lower due to large
numbers of non-citizen and underage
Hispanics. None of the nine Hispanics
who had run for office before the suit
was filed had been elected.
In 1985, Mexican-Americans challenged the at-large system, alleging that
its use in selecting the six city council
members lessened their opportunity to
participate and to elect representatives
of their choice. Following trial, District
Court Judge Ingram held that the plaintiffs had not stated a case under section
2 of the Voting Rights Act.
The Court of Appeals, per Judges
Goodwin, Nelson, and Gilliam, reversed.
The court cited the three standards
necessary to show a Section 2 violation.
The minority group must be (1) large
and geographically compact enough to
make a majority in a single-member district; (2) politically cohesive; and (3)
faced by a majority that votes as a bloc
to usually defeat the minority's candidate. Once these threshold requirements
are met, the plaintiffs must also show
that the "totality of the circumstances"
establishes that the minority group does
not have an equal opportunity to participate or elect representatives of its
choosing.
Here the plaintiffs established, inter
alia, that there was racially polarized
voting under the threshold tests, that
minorities had no electoral success, and
that the use of a single district coupled
with no residency requirement diluted
minority voting.
In addition, the court overturned the
trial court's finding that there was 'no
evidence whatever of official discriminatory practices of any sort directed at
the Hispanic residents of Watsonville,
either presently or historically."' The
court of appeals cited a lengthy list of
sources, from California and elsewhere,
in support of its finding that "[d]iscrimination against Hispanics in California
and the Southwest has pervaded nearly
all aspects of public and private life."
The court held that "the district court's
conclusions on discrimination are clearly
erroneous."

The Ninth Circuit recently held that
the California Department of Health
Services (DHS) violated the civil rights
of an employee by punishing her for
appearing at a hearing regarding abortion funding.
Plaintiff is a civil service attorney in
the DHS, with the designation "lead
attorney". Her job does not involve
issues related to abortions or abortion
rights. On September 11, 1984, she requested two hours' vacation time to
attend a legislative committee hearing
on the subject of public funding for
abortions. Her request was denied by
two supervisors, at least partially on the
grounds that plaintiff supported the
right to abortion and public funding for
abortions, while the DHS did not. Plaintiff attended the hearing; she did not
speak or otherwise make her presence
known at the hearing, but her supervisor
indicated "embarrassment" at her presence, and feared she might be called
upon by the committee to speak. That
afternoon, plaintiff's section was reorganized to remove her functions, and
her supervisors sought legal and other
advice on what actions they could take
in response to her attendance at the
hearing. Plaintiff later won a grievance
allowing her to take the time as
vacation. She was transferred to another section.
Plaintiff filed suit in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging
she had been punished for exercising
her first amendment rights. Crossmotions for summary judgment were
denied. Defendants appealed on the
basis of qualified immunity.
The Ninth Circuit, per Judges
Noonan, Koelsch, and O'Scannion, affirmed. The court held that plaintiff had
a clearly established constitutional right
to attend the hearing, and that defendant's actions in transferring her and
otherwise were motivated solely by their
desire to punish her for attending. To
the extent they may have a good faith
defense because they sought legal advice
before acting, that advice came from a
subordinate and it was not sought to
determine the nature of her rights, but
the extent of their power to exact retribution. The case was remanded to consider other defenses and damages.

Johnston v. Koppes,

UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS

-F.2d___ 88 D.A.R. 8531,
No. 87-2980 (June 30, 1988).
Government Attorney Has Free Speech
Rights To Political Positions
Adverse to Employing Agency

Ramirez v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services,
.. F.Supp._...., 99 D.A.R. 12180,
No. CV85-6744-ER (C.D.Cal. August 2 1988).

Case Justifies Award of Fees In
Excess of $75 Per Hour in
Equal Access to Justice Case
A United States magistrate has
awarded a prevailing plaintiff attorneys'
fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act in excess of the statutory limit of
$75 per hour, due to an increase in the
cost of living.
In this case, the court awarded fees
following the plaintiff's successful challenge to the Department's finding that
he was not disabled. Plaintiffs entitlement to an award was not at issue. The
magistrate adjusted the $75 per hour
rate upward, using that portion of the
fee statute which prohibits a rate greater
than $75 per hour "unless the court
determines that an increase in the cost
of living...justifies a higher fee." 42
U.S.C. section 2412(d)(l)(C)(2)(A)(ii).
The court held that the statute required an increase, and that nothing
more than the fact of an increase in the
cost of living need be shown. Moreover,
the court held that the cost of living
should be calculated from the date of
the original enactment of the EAJA
(1981), rather than its reenactment in
1985. This holding is in line with those
of several other appellate courts, although the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has not yet ruled upon the
issue. Based on a cost of living increase
of 26.6% since 1981, the current fee
award rate is $94.95 per hour.
CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT
Lungren v. Deukmejian,
.... Cal. 3d___ 88 D.A.R. 8099,
No. S004740 (June 23, 1988).
Confirmation of Constitutiona!Officer
Requires Affirmative Vote of
Both Houses of Legislature
The California Supreme Court denied Dan Lungren's petition to be seated
as State Treasurer, holding that the
Senate's denial of confirmation was sufficient to prevent his taking office; the
Assembly's vote to confirm was not sufficient.
Under the California Constitution,
vacancies in constitutional offices such
as State Treasurer are filled by gubernatorial appointment, subject to confirmation by the legislature. Article V, section
5(b) provides that a nominee "shall take
office upon confirmation by a majority
of the membership of the Senate and a
majority of the membership of the Assembly...In the event the nominee is neither
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confirmed nor refused confirmation by
both the Senate and the Assembly within
90 days of the submission of the nomination, the nominee shall take office as if
he or she had been confirmed...."
The Governor and Lungren contended that the latter part of the cited
language meant that Lungren could take
office even if one house voted not to
confirm, if the other voted in favor; that
is, the legislature had to speak with a
single voice to deny confirmation, or the
default procedure took effect. The legislature and the Attorney General intervened, contending that confirmation
could only occur through the positive
vote of both houses.
The Supreme Court unanimously
adopted the legislature's position that
confirmation of office could only occur
from the positive vote of both houses,
or an affirmative vote by one and inaction by the other. If either house votes
not to confirm, the nominee is rejected
regardless of the action of the other
house.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OPINIONS
"Litigation Exception" to Public
Records Act Is Limited
No. 87-304 (July 13, 1988).
The Attorney General, responding
to a request from Assemblymember
Maxine Waters, has opined the following regarding the Public Records Act,
Government Code section 6250 et seq.,
and its exceptions in section 6254:
(1) The "pending litigation" exception in section 6254(b) is limited to
documents specifically prepared for litigation in which the agency is a party.
(2) A document prepared in the
regular course of an agency's business
does not become exempt either because
it might be relevant in future litigation,
or because a claim or suit is filed in
which the document may be relevant.
(3) If a police record is not exempt
from disclosure under the police records
provisions of section 6254(f), the filing
of a claim or litigation does not make it
exempt under section 6254(b).
(4) A claim filed under the California Tort Claims Act is not exempt from
disclosure under section 6254(b).
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